Investigating shame and selfishness in two-stage choice problems with interdependent alternatives

Authors

  • Shun Okuhara Faculty of Engineering Graduate School of Engineering, Mie University,1577 Kurimamachiya cho, Tsu, Mie , Japan. 514 8507.
  • Rafik Hadf Department of Social Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan.
  • Takayuki Ito Department of Social Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan.

Keywords:

Two-stage choice problem, Sequential decision-making, Utility theory, Altruism, Selfishness, Shame, Subjective norm, Dictator game

Abstract

Decision makers often have to reason about the fairness of their choices, especially when many partners are involved. This situation has urged the use of preferences that could encode the notions of fairness and altruism. There are instances of problems that suggest that the partners of the decision maker have interdependent preferences over the possible alternatives and that they might influence each other. In this paper, we investigate payoffs between the decision maker and passive recipients on second-stage choice problems. We provide a canonical example with dependent and independent alternatives and show how it affects the fairness and private payoffs of the decision maker.

Author Biographies

Shun Okuhara, Faculty of Engineering Graduate School of Engineering, Mie University,1577 Kurimamachiya cho, Tsu, Mie , Japan. 514 8507.

Shun Okuhara is currently a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Engineering at the Graduate School of Engineering and the Center for Data Science Education, in Mie University. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Engineering from the Nagoya Institute of Technology. He was an assistant professor at Fujita Health University in 2015, a Specially Appointed Assistant Professor at the Nagoya Institute of Technology in 2020, a Program-Specific Assistant Professor at Kyoto University from 2022, and a Visiting Assistant Professor at Nagoya Institute of Technology.

Rafik Hadf, Department of Social Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan.

Rafik Hadfi is currently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Informatics at Kyoto University. He received his M.Eng. and D.Eng. degrees from Nagoya Institute of Technology in 2012 and 2015. His research interests include automated decision-making, social simulations, and conversational AI. He is currently working on AI-enabled platforms to foster democratic deliberation, sustainable development, and gender equality.

Takayuki Ito, Department of Social Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan.

Takayuki Ito is Professor of Kyoto University. He received the B.E., M.E, and Doctor of Engineering from the Nagoya Institute of Technology(NIT) in 1995, 1997, and 2000, respectively. From 1999 to 2001, he was a research fellow of the JSPS. From 2000 to 2001, he was a visiting researcher at USC/ISI. From April 2001 to March 2003, he was an associate professor of JAIST. From April 2004 to March 2013, he was an associate professor of NIT. From April 2014 to September 2020, he was a professor of NIT. From October 2020, he is a professor of Kyoto University. From 2005 to 2006, he is a visiting researcher at Division of Engineering and Applied Science, Harvard University and a visiting researcher at the Center for Coordination Science, MIT Sloan School of Management. From 2008 to 2010, he was a visiting researcher at the Center for Collective Intelligence, MIT Sloan School of Management. From 2017 to 2018, he is an invited researcher of Artificial Intelligence Center of AIST, JAPAN. From March 5, 2019, he is the CTO of AgreeBit, inc. as an entrepreneur.

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Published

2022-04-07

How to Cite

1.
Okuhara S, Hadf R, Ito T. Investigating shame and selfishness in two-stage choice problems with interdependent alternatives. j.intell.inform. [internet]. 2022 Apr. 7 [cited 2025 Aug. 9];7(April):21. available from: https://ph05.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/JIIST/article/view/206

Issue

JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT INFORMATICS AND SMART TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 7, APRIL 2022

Section

Research Articles